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I find it difficult to locate, in time, the moment when research on informali- 
ty gained such a momentum in the social sciences, however I can at least recall a 
starting and arrival point. When I found inspiration to write a paper on the informal 
practices on the Odessa-Chisinau elektrichka1 that I presented at the Max Plack Insti- 
tute in Halle in 2005 (Polese 2006), “informality” was a term barely used in the so- 
cial sciences, let alone in post-socialist spaces. It was a couple of years ago that I can 
remember how relieved I was to come across like-minded individuals, such as Colin 
Williams who devoted considerable effort and time to studying on informality, and 
whose focus at that time was Ukraine. That was the first time when I met, at least in 
person, someone who seemed to be dedicating his whole (professional) life to the 
cause of informality. Things then radically changed. It was not until 2013 that things 
began to radically change. Following a short break, I returned to academia only to 
find myself thrown into one of the most significant events, to the best of my 
knowledge, on informality and the post-socialist world. Thanks to a series of gener- 
ous grants, my friend Nicolas Hayoz was able to invite to Fribourg approximately 
120 scholars working on informality in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Caucasus and 
Central Asia. The conference is also where I learned about the preparation of the 
“Global Encyclopaedia of Informality” (Ledeneva 2018) that eventually came out in 
2018 and is, to date, both the main world reference on informal practices and a 
starting point for those willing to understand informality beyond a monetary, or 
economic, perspective. By 2013, ‘Informality’ seemed to have grown in popularity 
and become a buzzword decorating articles, books, special issues and a variety of 
academics works from a variety of regions. In spite of this personal and autobio- 
graphic digression, I have no intention to deny the long history of debates around 
the meaning and uses of informality. If we look at a mostly economic view on in- 
 
1 The train travelling across the Ukrainian-Moldovan border (editor’s note). 
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formality, I usually locate the first discussions around post-WWII debates on devel- 
opment. Explorations of the informal sector, as it was called at that time, affected a 
number of economic and economistic positions (Lewis 1954, 1959) eventually 
evolving into several directions. From ultra-liberal views on corruption (Leff 1964) 
to the work of anthropologists shifting attention from monetary to non-monetary 
transactions; from the tangible and measurable to the symbolic and arguably intan- 
gible, for example Keith Hart’s seminal work on Ghana (1973). Studies from the 
same period also evolved into more critical theories, for instance maintaining that 
informality is needed for capitalist expansion. Ultimately, from the International 
Labour Organization (1972) to the OECD (Jütting and Laiglesia 2009), informal la- 
bour and economic informality have been acknowledged as a major global concern, 
leading to debates on whether informal and shadow economies should be ultimately 
settled to start building a more equal society from scratch. Or else whether one 
should work to the formalization of the informal sector. Over the past decade, thus, 
informality has thus come to take so many different meanings and has been “cap- 
tured” by other disciplines such as urban planning, development, corruption studies 
and governance at the same time. This is not to discourage future works seeking to 
build an interpretative framework on informality. In several years of research on in- 
formality, I have come across several meanings of informality that can be regarded 
as harming the state but not the society, harming both or even benefiting both state 
and the society and it would be worth continuing a quest towards a “theory of in- 
formality”. The problem with acceptance of informality is that not all practices that 
are considered harmful by international organizations are necessarily deleterious, or 
are perceived as such, by a society. By the same token, not all practices deemed ac- 
ceptable according to international standards or normative positions are guaranteed 
to achieve the expected results. In this, it is pertinent to begin from the matrix by 
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Van Schendel and Abrahams (2005) separating legalistic (legal/illegal) and cultural 
(licit/illicit) perspectives on a given action or practice. The underlying principle is 
that practices that are perceived as illegal might be regarded as acceptable (licit) by 
one or more segments of a society. In contrast, pressure from external actors might 
impose practices that are viewed as socially unacceptable in a given culture or con- 
text onto that country’s legal system. 
What follows in the next short sections is an attempt to classify informal 
practices with the simple goal of testing their applicability to different contexts and 
situations. I am sure more informalities can be “discovered”, but I find that, at least 
as a starting point, the four ‘flavours’ (Polese 2018a) laid out below provide a mech- 
anism for classifying the main directions of informality and provide ‘food for 
thought’. 
 
1. Flavour 1: informality in top politics 
This has been studied both in the context of domestic politics, and in par- 
ticular Ledeneva (2006, 2013) as a main figure in the field, and the work of Stone 
(2010) which covers the management of international organizations. The category 
can be stretched to include management of international disputes or political crises. 
For one thing, setting the agenda for the study of informal political institutions, 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) provide an extensive list of formal institutions, some of 
which are based in the Western world, that make wide use of informality in order to 
function. A further suggestion in the same direction is, in my view, the work Law- 
lessness and Economics (Dixit 2007) looking at the way, for the sake of better eco- 
nomic effectiveness, companies and extremely formal actors, choose to rely on in- 
formal institutions and mechanisms to settle international disputes. The general idea 
is that informality is not necessarily disruptive when it comes to high-level govern- 
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ance structures. For example, an institution, or entire system of governance, which 
is deemed dysfunctional according to theoretical prescriptions can at times run in a 
more orderly fashion than otherwise expected. This raises questions among some 
authors/practitioners who operate under more rigid theoretical precepts which may 
hinder any understanding of how ‘ineffective/corrupt’ systems function on a day- 
to-day basis. For post-Soviet spaces, Ledeneva is possibly the scholar with the long- 
est track-record of research on informality in the post-socialist region. Starting from 
the role of long-term relations and the practice of blat (favours) in Russian society 
and politics (Ledeneva 1998), she has chosen the word “sistema” (Ledeneva 2013) 
and used it to discuss “methods of informal governance.” In this context, institutions 
which are technically unreliable and ineffective function ‘successfully’ on the basis 
of centralized agency of one influential individual, for example Russian President 
Vladimir Putin in Ledeneva’s case. This person knows what strings to pull, whom 
to call upon and how to motivate people to eventually make things work. Although 
it seems to work perfectly in the short-run, this illusion of effectiveness is linked to 
the agency of a single person, and possibly his entourage, making it impossible to 
replicate the same structure and procedures once this person is no longer in charge. 
We talk, in other words, of a system of governance with no memory. The moment 
the leader departs, a transitory period is needed to re-create the power structures 
and dynamics which enabled the system to function and there is no guarantee that it 
will work in the same way, or in the same direction. Such a situation denies the 
principle of replicability of a public administration, political ideology or political sys- 
tem. A political ideology and a political system should outlive their creators, not die 
with them. A public administration should work the same way, and with the same 
effectiveness, regardless of any intergenerational divergence which may impact the 
leadership of the administration. A cognate study by Darden (2007) has also led to 
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similar results, showing that a highly corrupt political environment was not neces- 
sarily entirely dysfunctional. In fact, in his study on Ukraine he managed to show 
that, despite widespread blackmail and political corruption under the Leonid 
Kuchma administration (1994-2005), the Ukrainian parliament had managed to 
adopt an impressively high volume of laws and regulations. Arguably, the system 
worked and achieved tangible results, albeit in more unexpected circumstances and 
not according to the precepts of external observers. 
 
2. Flavour 2: economic informality 
Across the world, revenues are hidden, companies fail to register their busi- 
ness, workers operate in precarious conditions. These are not minor practices: a re- 
cent OECD report estimates that the informal sector makes up two thirds of the 
world economy (Jütting and Laiglesia 2009). Not surprisingly, this is also the catego- 
ry of informality on which research is most developed, especially in the field of eco- 
nomics. It is relatively easy to classify and measure it since it regards mostly eco- 
nomic and measurable activities. Research in this direction explores the role and ty- 
pology of actors involved in these kinds of activities and striving to conceal, misre- 
port or do their utmost to render them unmeasurable as shown by Putniņš and 
Sauka (2015) as well as Schneider (2013) and Medina and Schneider (2018), who 
have elaborated ways to estimate the level of informal economy in a given context. 
As far as economic informality can be regarded as damaging governance, reducing 
tax income and thus public spending, in environment with highly restrictive legisla- 
tion, whereby rules are difficult to navigate, can also act as a safety valve, allowing 
actors formally excluded from the economy of a country to operate on the market, 
although only under certain conditions and in specific cases. 
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3. Flavour 3: informal payments (or corruption) 
This is perhaps the widest, and thus the most confusing category of infor- 
mality used across countries and sectors. With some flexibility allowed, any ex- 
change between two, or more, actors can end up in this category. The problem with 
the amalgamation of all informal payments in one category here is double-edged 
sword. One is that, in a number of cases, the same category hosts very different 
transactions: payments of several millions to a politician to get a multi-million con- 
tract, or a small sum paid to a doctor thanking them for a service provided free of 
charge. The other is that the same gesture may have different meanings depending 
on the context. For instance, a payment demanded before medical attention can be 
regarded as blackmailing (for example, if payment is not received, I will not oper- 
ate/prescribe these drugs) but a payment after the service can be regarded as a sign 
of gratitude (for example, please kindly accept this gift for having gone above and 
beyond in helping us). However, corruption is used to refer to anything, from a 
one-off payment to a bureaucrat to previously-agreed payments to the medical staff 
upon giving birth to a payment to a politician to get a given law approved in the 
parliament. And the category is expanding and, in an effort to find a satisfactory 
definition, international organizations sometimes provide a definition of informality 
that is way too close to other social phenomena. For one thing, consider the defini- 
tion of a ‘bribe’ put forth by the IMF (Tanzi 1998) as a gift which implies expected 
reciprocation. It creates a category where any kind of social exchange can be flagged 
as a bribe. However, in societies where interdependence between citizens is very 
high, gift-giving may respond to social etiquette requirements. In some occasions, 
these payments make the system work, are a contribution to salaries (Polese 2006), 
make feel civil servants gratified (Patico 2002), make up for limited cash available 
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(Rivken-Fish 2005). These kinds of payments are arguable a solution, not necessari- 
ly the problem itself. 
 
4. Flavour 4: informality and a path to infrapolitics 
Take a situation in which a citizen of a given country is behaving in a way 
which is not in accordance with said country’s laws and norms. In a standard situa- 
tion, the person would be considered a deviant or, in a more extreme case, a crimi- 
nal. Multiply this situation by a thousand of times and apply it to a large number of 
citizens and you have what Scott has defined as infrapolitics (2012). What is the value 
of a rule that few, if anyone, abide to? A state can give instructions, in the form of 
laws and rules, on how people should behave. They have enforcing and punishment 
mechanisms to deal with the isolated non-compliance cases. What happens when 
non-compliance becomes the norm? Or at least it is widespread among certain seg- 
ments of a population or some geographical areas? Public policy is successful when 
it benefits the majority of the citizens of a country, who will in turn actively support 
such a policy. What about the rest of the citizens? They should support the policy at 
least passively, that is not to oppose it. Still, there are cases where disagreement with 
a policy leads to passive resistance by “forgetting” to follow a given rule, or inter- 
preting in a different way, as documented by Scott (1984). This also emerges 
through the papers in this special issue, with the authors looking at the intersection 
between patterns of behaviour that generate at the societal level and how they might 
potentially contradict state-originated rules and laws and how compromises are 
found. There are no pre-defined patterns. In some case the state proposes some 
rules and people follow. In some other cases, people do not automatically follow 
the instructions received, they oppose them, renegotiate them or even fight them. 
In some other cases, people come up with their own rules and the state, or the 
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country’s elites, after some initial resistance, realize that could contribute to better 
governance in some sphere. This eventually leads to the transformation of an in- 
formal rule, or behaviour, into a formal one, what I call “purchase” by the state of an 
informal practice (Polese 2016a, 30). The problem of the liquidation-formalization 
dichotomy is two-fold. First, who shall decide what it is worth keeping and thus 
formalize and what, instead, should be liquidated, destroyed and rebuilt from 
scratch? Hypotheses and assumptions can be made, and a variety of considerations 
might guide law-makers in the decisions. However it ultimately sounds like a moral 
judgment to separate what it is worth preserving versus what needs to be erased in 
the economy of a country. The problem is, as many have noticed, that each practice 
may have a different meaning depending on the context (Gill 1998; Gudeman 
2001). Ultimately, there is no one informality but many. While I still believe in the 
distinction between “the two informalities” (Polese 2016b) with one going against the 
state and the other helping it to function in spite of its dysfunctionalities and idio- 
syncrasies. However even practices formally going against a state could be, in some 
cases, domesticated or institutionalized and eventually be taken advantage of. 
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5. Epilogue: who needs (what) informality? 
Informality research provides excellent food for thought and a basis to criti- 
cally look at a number of widely accepted normative assumptions; yet, it tends to 
suggest that ‘things do not work the way they are supposed to work’, that is, accord- 
ing to mainstream predictions of social and economic theories. What it seems to be 
lacking in informality research, then, is a thorough reflection on how things actually 
work, behind and beyond the above-mentioned predictions. 
From a public policy perspective, informality could be used to improve state 
performance, governance structures and dynamics. Each policy  measure brings 
forth both advantages and disadvantages on various parts of the population. Some 
segments of a population might find it advantageous to abide by a certain rule or a 
ruling elite might impose some additional costs for some parts of a society, or even 
its entirety, in order to achieve their overarching goals. In other words, it becomes 
convenient to go beyond ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to move through other categories such as 
long or short-term benefits for a given category or segment of a population. In 
some cases, public policy might negatively impact a large portion of the population 
in favour of a minority which is more in need of immediate assistance. 
If we embrace this perspective then informality, or at least some informali- 
ties, can be regarded as being neutral and in bringing both advantages and 
disadvantages. Allowing development of a form of informality, or simply refusing 
to liquidate a given form of informality, may be regarded as an act of public policy 
as far as there is awareness of what are the advantages of a given form of 
informality and they are in line with the objectives set for a given period. 
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